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It is very  nice to be with you again.  As  many of you know, I am
an  old  land  grant  man  myself.  I  think  many  of you are  from that
dispensation.  When  I  was  a  young  man  I  taught  in  Ames  at  Iowa
State  College,  and I  always  say that it was there I was indoctrinated
with  the  "Morrill"  point of view.  So  I  thought I would  talk to  you
this evening about what I call the moral environment of public policy.
I  define  the  moral  environment  as  that  part  of  human behavior
and interaction  which  criticizes  people's preferences.  I insist that all
values  we  know  anything about are  human  values.  They start off, as
every  economist  knows,  with  preferences  enshrined  in indifference
curves.  You  may  remember,  I  have  complained  that  economists
seem  to  believe  in what  I called  the  Immaculate  Conception  of the
Indifference  Curve, until  a Jesuit  friend told me  I had the  Immacu-
late  Conception  wrong.  Anyway,  we  do  seem to  believe  preferences
come  from  heaven  in  some  mysterious  way  and  don't have  to  be
inquired into.
The fact  is that  all human  valuations beyond  extremely  primitive
genetic  structure  are  learned.  We  come  into  the  world liking  milk,
mother,  or  terry  cloth,  or  some  reasonable  substitute.  Then  of
course,  everything  else  is  added  on  to  us  by  learning.  Part  of this
learning  process  is by disappointments,  that  is, making mistakes and
then learning from  the experience of failure; we never learn anything
from  success  except  what  we  knew  already  and that doesn't help us
much.  We  also  learn from criticism,  both our own and other people's
and  this  is,  in  a  sense,  the moral  environment.  This  starts with the
raised  eyebrow  that  the  freshman  meets  when  he  or  she  makes  a
gaffe in the dorm.
The raised eyebrow is probably the most powerful sermon there is;
this brings you into  line very  fast. Certainly  any subculture develops
an  ethos,  which  is  a  critique  of  preferences  of  the  members  of it.
That  is, if you belong to a motorcycle  gang and you don't really like
motorcycles,  you  won't  last  very  long and there  will  be raised  eye-
brows  all  over the place.  Soon,  you will either get out or you will be
pushed  out.  We  find  this  in  our  own  professions.  There  are  things
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tenure;  it  occasionally  happens.  There  are  certainly  things  that
politicians can do, and they won't get re-elected.
You  can  look  at  this  as  a  series  of  levels.  First-order  ethics  is
saying  I  think  your  preferences  are  lousy  or  wonderful  as the case
may  be.  If you have  a preference  for heroin  or murdering  people,  I
don't just  say,  "How  interesting";  I  am not really  a relativist,  I  say
your  preferences  are  lousy.  No  question  about  it.  This  is  ethical
critique.
At  a  higher  level,  what  I  call  second-order  ethics,  is  to  say,  "I
think your  ethics  are lousy,"  especially,  of course,  your criticism of
me.  These  things  interact  all  the  time  in  society.  They  are part  of
what  I  call  the  integrative  system,  which  ultimately  dominates  all
other  systems  in  society.  That  is,  you can't  sustain  either  exchange
or markets  or political  structures  unless they are legitimated, that is,
unless  they  are  part  of  the  ethos.  When  the  ethos  changes,  these
institutions change too.
Once  when  I  was in  Leningrad  I was rather amused to  see that the
old  stock  exchange  is  now  a  palace  of  culture  and  rest.  In  that
society  political  and  ethical  changes  made the capital market illegiti-
mate.  It couldn't  survive  under those circumstances,  just as slavery is
no longer legitimate and cannot survive.
As  we  look  toward  the  public  policy aspects,  we run into  a very
awkward  fact.  Everybody  has rather different  values  and valuations
and  every  group  has rather different  ethics  and  a different  ethos.  It
is  not  all  a  uniform  set  of  preferences.  There  isn't even  a uniform
set  of  ethical  systems.  Yet  the  political  system  has  come  to  grips
with how you coordinate  the different valuations of different people.
I  have  argued  that there  are  three  main methods  of doing this in
society.  I  use  the  word  "coordinate"  advisedly,  because  we  do not
all  come  to the same  answers.  Coordination  is not the same thing as
agreement  by  any  means.  I  have  been  calling  these  the three  "P's."
I  am  a great  trinitarian.  I  believe  everything  comes  in  threes  as  over
against  twos  in  dialectics!  These  are  "prices,"  "policemen,"  and
"preachments."  Prices, of course, are the market.
We  are  mostly  economists  here,  so  we  are  all familiar  with  this.
It  does  coordinate  the  different  valuations  of  different  people  in
quite  extraordinary  ways.  Remember  the  old  nursery  rhyme,  "She
liked  coffee  and  I  liked  tea,  and  that  was  the  reason  we  couldn't
agree."  That  was  the  reason,  no  doubt,  why  they  both  went  to
the  little  brown  jug!  The  wonderful  thing about  having  a market
is that then you don't have to agree.  In fact,  I like tea for breakfast,
and  my  wife  likes  coffee  and there  is  no  problem  at all.  I have  tea
and she has coffee.
4Mancur  Olson,  I  think,  has  pointed  out  that  the  great  ethical
virtue  of  the  market  is  that  it  economizes  agreement.  You  don't
have  to  agree  if  there  is  a  market  because  the market,  in  so  far  as
it  provides  private  goods,  will  satisfy  a great diversity  of valuations.
I think this is a very important point.
On  the  other  hand,  in  spite  of  my  friend  Milton  Friedman,  and
some  of  my  best  friends  are  Milton  Friedmans,  the  market  really
can't  do  everything.  There  are  public  "goods"  and  public  "bads,"
so  we have to  go  to the second  "P,"  which  is  policemen  or politics.
The  political  order  organizes  society  essentially  through  legiti-
mated  threat.  That  is,  the  market  is exchange;  it  has  a few under-
lying  threat  elements  in  the  enforcement of  contracts, and it has a
legal  framework,  but on the  whole,  the threat element is very minor
in  the market.  The  great virtue  of exchange  is that it has more vetos
in  it  than  the  United  Nations.  If  I  don't want to  buy  something,  I
don't  have  to.  If  I  don't  want  to  sell  something,  I  don't have  to.
In  a  free  exchange  each  of the parties  has  a veto.  Then,  of course,
there  are  the  things  you  cannot  handle  this  way,  and you have  to
have  a  legitimated  threat  system.  Thus,  we have to have  taxes,  and
I  will  be  very  frank  with you,  I  pay  my income tax at least  95% out
of  threat.  An  easy  measure  of  this  is  how  much  would  you  con-
tribute to the federal  government  if it was  done  through the United
Fund.  With  a little bit of pressure  I  think I  might contribute  5%  of
what I do now, but not much more than that.
If we  were  all  honest  with  ourselves,  I  am sure we would all agree
on this. On  the other  hand, in a certain sense, as a legitimated threat
we  will  put up with taxes if everybody  has to put up with them. The
reason for politics,  as  a good  many  people have pointed out, is what
is called  the  "freeloader  problem."  That is, if you leave public goods
to free  exchange or to the grants economy, there won't be enough of
them.
There  is also  a certain  principle  that if you have  too highly legiti-
mated  a threat system,  you get too much  of it and there  is  a worry
about that. There  is a certain  tendency for governments  to be addic-
tive  of themselves,  rather like heroin, and to grow all the time. Then,
of course, to some extent this is what the American Constitution  was
all  about.  The  founding  fathers  were  not  anarchists,  they  thought
you had to have  a government,  but they  also thought you shouldn't
have too much  of it.  This  is  where the whole division of powers and
all that kind of stuff comes from.
In  a  sense  this country  is designed  so that  anybody  can stop any-
body  doing  anything.  There  is  something  to  be  said  for  this,  if
otherwise  you are  going  to do too  much. There  is  quite a tendency
for governments  to do too much and almost for everybody to do too
much.  One  of  the  famous  stories,  probably  apocryphal,  is  that
Eisenhower  once  said  to  Dulles,  "Don't  just  do  something,  stand
there."
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do  is  nothing.  This  is  often the hardest  thing to do,  even  when it is
the right thing to do, because  we have this enormous itch to be active
and  do  something.  So as  I say,  I have  a certain  fondness, especially
as  a naturalized  American,  for the Constitution  and  all  that and  for
the  kind  of  political  philosophy  which  regards  the  government  as
what you might call a necessary  evil.
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  American  political  system  has had  a
very  extraordinary  success.  I  think  we  are  now  the eleventh  oldest
country  in  the  world  in  terms  of  continuity  of  political  system,
though  it is certainly  a little  hard  to  say  when  some  of them began.
We  are  certainly  older  than  the  French  Revolution,  not quite so old
as  the  Glorious  Revolution  of  England,  and  certainly  very  much
older than the vast majority of countries in the world.
We  have  had  quite  an  astonishingly  stable  political  system.  Even
the  Great  Depression,  which  was  an  enormously  traumatic  experi-
ence  for this country,  really  produced  no basic changes  in the politi-
cal  system.  In  fact,  it took the Great  Depression  to  get rid of Prohi-
bition!  The  party  system  is  the  same,  the  electoral  system  is  the
same,  we  have  never  even  gotten  rid  of the  electoral  college.  It has
lasted  for  200  years  doing  absolutely  nothing,  which  I rather like.
It  reminds  me  of my  old  college  at Oxford,  New  College. It has just
celebrated  its  600th  anniversary,  which  is  why  it  is  called  New
College.  I  was  absolutely  delighted  with  a  history  of  New  College
which  I  have just  read,  because  the historian  couldn't deny the fact
that  for  500  years  the  college  did  nothing  whatever.  It  did  not
produce  anybody  except  a  long  line  of  undistinguished  country
clergymen,  and  the  Fellows  were  corrupt  and  depraved  and  just
spent all their time drinking in the common room.
I  suspect  that  the  secret  of the  American  political  system  is that
we  don't  really  take  it  seriously.  That  is,  it has  what  I  call  a ritual
dialectic,  rather  like  sports.  You  see,  sports  are  a  ritual  dialectic.
I  almost hate  to tell  you this, but it doesn't really  matter  who wins
a football  game,  for if it would  really  matter,  you would poison the
opponents'  beer.  But you  do  have  to  pretend  that  it  matters  who
wins, or the game falls apart.
Politics  are very  much  like  a football  game.  That  is,  it very rarely
matters  much  who  gets  elected.  If  it  ever  did  matter,  the  system
would  probably  collapse.  This,  I  think,  is  the  secret  of the success
of  the  American  political  system  and  the  very  substantial  success
of American  society.  It  all  comes  out  of the fact that we are incura-
bly  frivolous  people  and this  means  we don't  get into  serious rows.
Every  time when  there is a row, somebody tells a joke and the whole
thing dissolves.  Whereas  in many other societies,  which  I won't name,
where  politics  are  deadly  serious,  it  can  be  terribly destructive.  The
awful  example  is Cambodia,  where politics has destroyed the society.
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little  frivolously  and  easy  is  enormously  destructive.  So, I  think we
have  an enormous  amount  to  be thankful  for in that we  are  a light-
hearted  people.  It sounds better than frivolous.  When  things get too
serious, somebody will say something that is funny.
The  third  "P"  is,  of  course,  preachments.  This  is  the ethos, the
moral  involvement  and the moral  order and,  as I say, there is a great
deal  to be  said to show that this really dominates the other two. All
this  leads  into the  evaluation  of public policy,  which  is,  I think, the
major  interest  of this  meeting.  This  is  a  problem  of extraordinary
complexity.
It  is  not  only  because  everybody  has their  own  ideas and  values
about it, so that we have this coordination problem, but also because
we  are  dealing  with  systems  of very  great  complexity,  including  us.
After  all,  the human brain has something between  10 and 100 billion
neurons.  Biologists  can't count, whatever  it is; anyway, let's make it
50  billion.  That  is  a  hell  of  a lot of marbles.  Even though  you  are
supposed  to  lose  100,000  a  day,  even  at  the  age  of  70,  I  think  I
still have a lot left.
This  is  a system  of quite inconceivable  complexity.  When you add
to  this  all  the  human  interactions  and  environments  we  can  be  al-
most  overcome  by the complexity.  So,  of course, we try to simplify
it. In  fact,  in  a sense,  I  almost  define  learning  as the orderly loss  of
information.  We  all  have  this  huge,  buzzing  information  thrown at
us all  the time,  even in the womb, probably, and certainly after that.
To  reduce  it to some  sort  of image  that  we  can  handle,  we  have to
filter it out and  organize  it and  maybe quantify it, which is one way
of losing information.  This  is necessary.  On  the other hand,  we also
ought  to  be  aware  that it  is  rather dangerous,  because  you can  lose
too  much  information  and you can  oversimplify  and  there  are  very
real dangers in this.
Particularly,  there  are  dangers  in  an  unexamined  quantification.
I  have  been  going on  a bit of a campaign  lately  about  numerology,
and  the  assumption  that  science  is  measurement,  which  it  isn't  at
all.  Measurement  is  certainly  one  of  the  methods  by  which  we  ac-
quire  better information,  but there are about a dozen numbers in the
real  world.  There  is  e,  lr, the velocity  of light, Planck's constant and
0,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5, 6,  up  to  7 maybe, but after that it is all a figment of
the human imagination.  In the woods, nobody counts anything. Well,
birds  I  think  can  count  eggs  up  to  4,  if they  are  very  clever  birds.
But what  you  have  in the real  world is  essentially  shapes  and  sizes.
That is, the real world is topological rather than numerical.
The  trouble  is that  our minds find it very difficult to handle com-
plex  topological  structures  without  a  good deal  of palaver,  particu-
larly  in  more  than  3  or  4  dimensions.  And,  of course,  it is  a very
convenient  property  of numbers that they can be mapped into topo-
logical  structures  of  considerable  complexity.  That  is why  statistics
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up  at  NCAR  (the  National  Center  on  Atmospheric  Research)  at
Boulder  (the  Vatican  of  meterologists)  and  they  have  one  of the
biggest  computers  in the world  in  the basement.  I  am  not sure  that
it  does  them  much  good,  but  it adds  to  their prestige.  Anyway,  in
this computer  there  is the  latitude,  longitude,  and altitude  of a very
large  number  of  places  on  the  earth's  surface.  You  can  define  the
position  of  any  point  on  the  earth's  surface  with  three  arbitrary
numbers, but then all measurement numbers  are arbitrary.
This  very  clever  computer  can  print  out maps  of the  world  in  a
polar  projection  from  any  point,  which  are very  nice to have.  If it
printed  out  the numbers  they  wouldn't tell you a thing.  Nearly  all
numerical  information  has  to  be  translated  in  topological  terms  if
it  is  going  to  be  meaningful.  Economics,  for instance,  has  gotten
into  a kind of Newtonian  numerical  bog from which it doesn't  seem
to be able to emerge.  I am very distressed  about it.
We  see  how careful  we have  to  be about  using numbers  when we
look  at  concepts  of  efficiency.  We  often  think  that  the  test  of
something  is  whether  it  is  "efficient."  Then  you  look  at  the  effi-
ciency  concepts  and  see  that  they  are only  significant  if  efficiency
is  measured  in  terms  of human  valuations.  There  are  no  values  in
nature,  except  what we  impose  on it.  At least if there  are, we don't
know much  about  them.  There  may indeed  be  "One  far  off divine
event  towards  which the whole  creation  moves," as Tennyson  says,
but we don't know much about it.
Certainly  nature  doesn't mind  having an endangered  species; there
are  999  extinct  ones  for every  extant  one.  Nature  didn't care about
the dinosaurs, and nature doesn't care anything about the blue whale.
I  do,  about  $25  a  year  worth,  but  the  blue  whale  doesn't  give  a
damn  about  me,  and  actually  the  blue  whale  doesn't  even  give  a
damn  about  the  blue  whale.  I  am  sure it doesn't  have  the slightest
idea  that it  is  an  endangered  species.  You  have  to  be  careful  not to
impose more values on nature than it can really take.
We  run  into  similar  problems  with  things  like  thermodynamic
efficiency.  There  is  a  certain  movement  today  toward  an  energy
theory  of  value  or  maybe  even  an  entropy  theory  of  value.  This
seems  to  be  garbage.  You  can  have  processes  which  have  negative
net  energy  but if the energy  which  goes  in  isn't worth  much  and  if
what  comes  out  is worth  a lot, they  may  be fine  in terms of human
valuations.
All  processes  must  be  evaluated  from  the point of view of human
values.  I  am  certainly  not saying  that  accounting  values  are  a  suffi-
cient  and  adequate  measure of human values, although they may not
be  a  bad  first  approximation.  In  all  political  decisions,  and also  in
business  decisions  as  well,  accounting  values  are  modified  in  the
overall  decision  making  process.  Even  banks don't hold their  assets
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uncertainties,  and  anybody can increase his earnings by going toward
the  edge  of the  cliff, but we  don't do  it; we draw back. So account-
ing  values  are  only part  of the  picture,  quite  an  important part but
by  no  means  the  only  part.  We  all  make  decisions  which result  in
having  a  lower  accounting  net  worth  but  a  higher  net  worth  pre-
sumably in the more ultimate values,  whatever they are.
What  all  this  is  leading  up to  is that  I am  on a  bit of a rampage
now  in  favor  of  developing  what  I  call  "normative  science"  or
perhaps  it  had  better  be  called  "normative  studies"  because  science
is  a  word  that  has  gotten  a  bit soiled,  I  won't mention  any  names.
I argue  that  a  discipline  of normative studies is possible  and that this
means  essentially  applying  certainly  the  ethic  and  the method  of
science  to  two  questions.  The  first  is  what  do  we  really  mean  by
things  going  from  bad  to  better  rather  than  from  bad  to  worse?
And  we  can  explore  this.  This  is  something that is part  of the real
world,  involving  evaluations  of  total  system.  We  are  not  going  to
come  out with single answers.
We  will  always  have  the coordination  problem,  but we  can make
better  evaluations  rather than worse.  Then,  of course,  once we  find
out what you mean by going from bad to better, the second question
is  how  do  you  do  it?  This  is  what  I call  my hundred-year  project.
I  probably  won't  finish  it,  but  anyway  it  suggests  that it is  a very
important  field  of human  study,  in which  the ethic  and the method
of science can be used.
We  have  quite  a bit of normative  studies  already lying around the
landscape,  though it hasn't been  brought  together very  much. Thus,
as  all  economists  know,  we  have  welfare  economics,  which  was  a
very  serious  attempt  on  the  part  of  economists  who  answer  the
questions,  "What  do  we  mean  as economists by  things going  from
bad to better rather than from  bad to worse?".  I know that Samuelson
pointed  out  that  there  isn't  really  any  way  to say,  but at least the
exercise  was  very  valuable.  It clarifies  a lot of thinking,  and it came
up  with  concepts  like  the  Pareto  optimum  which  are  not  in  any
sense absolute but which are extraordinarily  useful.
If  you  have  a  change  which  makes  some  people  better  off  and
nobody  worse  off, that's nice,  although  [of course]  it assumes  that
there  is  no  envy  and no greed.  In  fact,  economists  are terribly  nice
people  even  if  they  are  a bit naive,  because  only nice  people  could
come  up with  a Pareto  optimum,  which  supposes that when you get
better  off  and  I  do  not,  I  should  be delighted.  Economists  assume
there isn't much practice of the seven deadly sins. Still, as you know,
there  is  malevolence  in  the  world  and  there  is  envy  and  greed  and
gluttony.  Economists  also  assume  that people  don't have  any of the
seven cardinal virtues, either, but that is another story.
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part of a second or even third order ethics. There has to be a critique
of  virtue  because  if  you  aren't  careful,  virtue  can  do more  damage
than  vice.  So  what  do  you look for?  The first principle  I have called
the principle of the  best alternative. This  is  good  economics.  You
look over  the field  of choice  and you look for the best. The dangers
of  second  order  moralists  is  they  tend to think if you prove  some-
thing  is  bad, that is  a sufficient  argument  against  it, which  it is not.
You  always  have  to  show  that  something  else  is  either  better  or
worse. There is a kind of "prohibition syndrome."
I  came  to  this  country  under  Prohibition.  We  had  Prohibition
and  it  turned  out,  I  think in the long run, to  be the  wrong  answer
to a very  real  problem. Alcoholism  is still a terribly real problem and
does an  enormous  amount  of damage.  But Prohibition  was too easy
a  solution.  I  even  worry  about  ERA  although  I  am  a very  staunch
advocate of women's rights.
My  wife  is  now  teaching  2,000  miles  from  where  I  am,  so  we
are  sustaining  two households  2,000  miles apart,  which isn't exactly
energy  conserving,  but I  am  very  glad  she  is doing this. I was one of
the first members  of the Committee  on the  Status of Women in the
Economics  Profession  of  the  American  Economic  Association.  But
I  still  worry  about  simple  solutions that can easily distract attention
from the complexity  of problems.
The  second  principle  may  be  called  the principle of net goodness.
Virtually  everything  comes  along  with  goods  and  bads  as  joint
products.  It  is  extraordinarily  hard  to  think  of  anything  which  is
purely  good  or purely  bad.  Here  we  have  this nice electric light, but
I  am sure it is produced by some power station that is belching some-
thing into the atmosphere,  at least  CO2.
I drove here in my little  Honda, which I enjoyed, it was a beautiful
drive,  certainly  a good.  But it polluted the air going through Denver.
Everybody  like  myself  who  has  a  happy  marriage  knows  perfectly
well it has  a few  sour  things in  it.  So, the joint production of goods
and bads  is  a very  fundamental  principle.  It means  you always  have
to  do  cost-benefit  analysis  on  a  broad  scale  and  evaluate  both the
goods and the bads.
The third  principle  - and  these  principles are all closely related-
is  what  I  call  the  principle of  maximum  goodness.  Every  virtue
becomes  a  vice  if you have too much of it. That is, if you take a slice
of the  "goodness  function"  along  one  of  its  variables  it  would  be
something  like  a  parabola.  Riches  are  a  very  good  example.  When
people  are  poor,  there  is  very  little  doubt  that  getting  richer  is  a
movement  from  bad  to  better.  When  people  are  filthy  rich,  which
means  anybody  twice  as  rich  as  I  am,  then  getting  richer  may  be
worse. It  may  corrupt  people.  I am not certain  this doesn't  even go
for health.  Health  is  certainly good up to a certain point. But I think
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bit too much of it.
I  remember  having  a  big  argument  about this  with  Clyde  Kluck-
hohn,  the  anthropologist.  He  felt  that  there  were  these  absolute
things  like  health  and  I  was  arguing that  at  least  tuberculosis  pro-
duced  a  certain  amount  of wonderful  English  poetry.  If we  didn't
have  a  little  bit  of ill  health,  it  might result  in  an  insensitivity  to
certain  things.  But  still  I am  prepared  to go in for health, obviously,
a very long way.
The  fourth,  a  very  interesting  principle,  which  is  also  a  very
tough  one,  is  what  I  call the principle of moral perspective. This  is
the  principle  that  what  is  near  tends  to  be  dear.  I  supported  my
children  in  college  and  even  now  they  are  going  on  to  graduate
school,  but  I  haven't  supported  any  Chinese  peasants  in  Szechwan.
They  are  too far  away.  It  is  a very reasonable  principle, and is some-
what  related  to the  general  principle  of  perspective  in  perception.
The near person looks  bigger to me than the distant one.
There  is  obviously  a  very  good  evolutionary  reason  for  this.  If
the  thing  that  is just going to  eat you  is  a foot away  but looks the
same  as  if  it  were  a  mile  away,  you  wouldn't  last very  long,  so
obviously  natural  selection  makes  for  perceptual  perspective.  On
the  other  hand,  in  visual  perspective  we  know  that  in  a  certain
sense  it is  an  illusion.  The  near  looks bigger to  me than  the  far, but
it isn't really  bigger,  it is just the  same size. We know this and some-
how make  allowances  for it.  And  you wonder if there isn't  a rather
similar principle  in  moral  perspective,  that in a sense it is a necessary
illusion.  Certainly  everybody  who  loves  everybody  equally  doesn't
love anybody very much out of 41/4 billion people.
There  are  tough  moral  problems  here.  Just  where  "dearness"
disappears  is  a  very  critical  problem.  I  argue  that it shouldn't  ever
quite  disappear,  I should  be just a little concerned about the peasant
in  Szechwan,  even  though  I  don't  know  him.  We  recognize  this.
We  have  foreign  aid,  1/2  of  1%  or  something,  not'very  much.  And
there  is my  $25 for the whale, so we do overcome the rigid principle
of moral perspective.
The  fifth  principle  is  that  of  the emotional distortion of human
valuations. This  is  a tough one.  When  people  get angry  they tend to
make  bad  decisions,  and  when  they  are  calmer,  they  make  better
decisions.  We  are cluttered  up with  all  these adrenal glands  or some-
thing,  which  make  us  upset  or  even  euphoric.  Euphoria  can  also
create  very  bad  decisions.  We  observe  this  occasionally  with  young
people  in  love.  Intense  romantic  love  does not  always produce  the
best decisions regarding marriage.
The  problem  of emotional  distortion is a particularly  difficult one
because  we  put  a  certain  value  on  emotion  for its  own  sake.  Who
wants  to  be  a  cold  fish?  I  have  sometimes  said  that the economic
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to marry  one.  You want  somebody who is just a little  crazy and goes
barefoot  in the park  or something, or writes  poetry or paints or does
something  a  little  idiotic,  or  even  goes backpacking  or  even  skiing.
As  long  as  people  ski,  it  seems  to me  there is hope  for the human
race.
I  can't  think  of  anything  more  foolish  than  just  going  up  a hill
and  sliding down  in  the snow.  The  only  thing that  is  crazier  is  golf;
Conrad  defined  a  golfer  as  a  man  with  an  impediment  in  his  walk.
Still,  I  anm  glad  people  like  skiing and  I am glad they like golf as long
as I don't have to do it. But it is a worrying problem.
I  worry  about  emotional  distortion,  particularly with the radicals,
even  though  some  of my best friends  are radicals,  because they tend
to  be  dominated  by  the  hatred  of  evil  rather  than  by  the  love  of
good.  These  are  really  very  different  things.  I  am  not  coming  out
against  the  hatred  of  evil  altogether  because  this  creates  a  certain
amount of steam,  but if you don't have the steam engine of the love
of good to put it in, then you are in trouble.
I have  seen  this often  with  my radical  friends. My  wife and  I had
a very  strange  relation  with the  SDS, the  Students for a Democratic
Society,  in  the  1960's.  My wife  asserts it was  founded  in  our living
room  in  Ann  Arbor. Tom  Hayden was  a  student of mine  and these
youngsters  used  to  come  out to  our house  because  they  knew they
wouldn't  get  in trouble  there.  We  always  had  a big  New  Year's  Eve
party  and they  all  came  out to that  and after  we  saw the New Year
in  then  I  went to  bed,  but  my  wife  stayed  up  with  the  kids  and
that's  where  they  plotted the Port  Huron  Conference  which  started
the  SDS. The  SDS  died in  our  basement  in  Boulder.  They had their
last conference  in Boulder  about  1970, and they asked  if they could
meet in our house again,  because they trusted us.
The  organization  fell  apart  because  everyone  was  against  some-
thing and  nobody  was for anything.  The  trouble is  if you are domi-
nated  by  the hatred  of evil, you get to hate  it in other people, which
means  everybody,  and  things  fall  apart.  The  radical  hates  evil  too
much  and  the  conservative  loves  maybe  the  wrong  kind  of  good,
say  particularly  his  own  good,  so  there  is  a real  dilemma here.  How
do you balance the hatred of evil and the love of good?
The sixth  principle,  which  I am sure you all  know about, is what I
call  the principle of hierarchical  corruption. Every organization  is  a
device  for  preventing  information  reaching  the  executive,  that's
what  it  is  for.  Absolute  power  corrupts  absolutely,  and  the  only
trouble  is  that  impotence  also  corrupts,  and  absolute  impotence
corrupts  absolutely.  What is worse, influence corrupts more than any
of  these  probably  because  influence  is  irresponsible.  Yet  this  is
what  I have done all my life.  I have always run away from power and
gone  in for influence, and I cannot be sure  I haven't done more harm
than good.
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Association.  This  was  1968,  the  year  of  Chicago's  Mayor  Daley.
We  were  scheduled  to  meet  in  Chicago.  There  was  great  agitation
that  we  should  move  out  of  Chicago,  and  we  could  have  gone  to
Philadelphia.  My  Executive  Committee  was  split  exactly  50-50  on
this,  and  here  the  decision  was  in my  lap without  any alibis  at all.
I just had  to make  this decision  all  by  myself.  The only  time in my
life  I  ever had any  Boulding power;  I had the  power to  move  a half
million dollars from Chicago to Philadelphia.
Well,  I  thought about it very  carefully,  and the  decision  I finally
made  in  these  circumstances  was  different  from  the  way  I  would
have  voted  on  the committee.  On a committee you are irresponsible.
You  don't really  have  to  follow  through  with the  consequences  of
your  act.  So  that  shook  me up.  It made  me worry  about influence
and  all that.
On the  other hand,  there  is no  question that  power is corrupting.
There  is  what  I  call  the  dismal  theorem  of  political  science.  Eco-
nomics,  as you  know, has  been a  dismal  science for a long time, and
it  seems to  me  political  science  ought to have a dismal theorem too.
The  dismal theorem  in  political  science is that all the skills which
lead to the rise to power tend to  unfit people  to exercise  it.  It isn't
100% true and there  are happy  exceptions to it, particularly if there
are  strong  random  elements  in  the  selection  of powerful people  as
there  are  in  this  country.  But  if you rise by  promotion, this  is the
Peter  principle,  the  skills  which  lead  to  promotion  unfit  you  to
operate at the top.  This  is  a great dilemma in political structure, and
I don't know what the  answer  is.  The  only answer  I  can think of is
the  introduction  of random  elements  in  the  selection  of the  occu-
pants  of powerful roles.
At the time of the last draft  I was arguing that if a lottery was good
for the draft,  why  wasn't  it good  for the Presidency?  As a matter of
fact,  that  is  what the Greeks  had.  And then it occurred  to  me that
this  is what  we had anyway  and we don't have to worry about it. A
person  becomes  President  of the United  States just because  a penny
turns  up heads  20 times  in the  course  of his life.  We  do  have  these
very  strong random  elements  and sometimes  we have  good luck and
sometimes  we have  bad luck. This shows what we may be in for now.
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